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Prepare and Measure Quantum Digital Signature: Difference between revisions
Prepare and Measure Quantum Digital Signature (edit)
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**Requires [[BB84 QKD]] setup (preparation and measurement of quantum states in two bases), [[authenticated classical channel]] | **Requires [[BB84 QKD]] setup (preparation and measurement of quantum states in two bases), [[authenticated classical channel]] | ||
**Requires [[authenticated quantum channel]] (assumption removed in a variant of the protocol) | **Requires [[authenticated quantum channel]] (assumption removed in a variant of the protocol) | ||
**Benchmark values per qubit: QBER: 1-3<math>\%</math>, Transmission distance(d): 200 km, Key Length: 2Mbits, Estimated time: 3.5s, attenuation:45.8dB at 200kms | **Benchmark values per qubit: QBER: 1-3<math>\%</math>, Transmission distance(d): 200 km, Key Length: 2Mbits, Estimated time: 3.5s, attenuation: 45.8dB at 200kms | ||
==Properties== | ==Properties== | ||
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##'''Requires''' authenticated classical channels, [[polarisation measurement]] in three bases, [[Unambiguous State Discrimination (USD)]] (State Elimination), uses quantum correlations to check authentication. Decoy State method uses [[Coherent States|phase-randomised weak coherent states]], [[50:50 Beam Splitter (BS)]]. | ##'''Requires''' authenticated classical channels, [[polarisation measurement]] in three bases, [[Unambiguous State Discrimination (USD)]] (State Elimination), uses quantum correlations to check authentication. Decoy State method uses [[Coherent States|phase-randomised weak coherent states]], [[50:50 Beam Splitter (BS)]]. | ||
##Security: [[Information-theoretic]]. | ##Security: [[Information-theoretic]]. | ||
#[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/280034032_Secure_Quantum_Signatures_Using_Insecure_Quantum_Channels AWKA (2015)] QDS scheme without authenticated quantum channels using parameter estimation phase. Uses a Key Generation Protocol (KGP) where noise threshold for Seller-Buyer and Seller-Verifier is better than when distilling secret key from QKD. Seller sends different key to Buyer and Verifier using KGP. This | #[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/280034032_Secure_Quantum_Signatures_Using_Insecure_Quantum_Channels AWKA (2015)] QDS scheme without authenticated quantum channels using parameter estimation phase. Uses a Key Generation Protocol (KGP) where noise threshold for Seller-Buyer and Seller-Verifier is better than when distilling secret key from QKD. Seller sends different key to Buyer and Verifier using KGP. This anomaly is justifiable due to symmetrisation. | ||
##'''Requires''' authenticated classical channels, [[Decoy State QKD]] setup. | ##'''Requires''' authenticated classical channels, [[Decoy State QKD]] setup. | ||
##Security: [[Information-theoretic]]. | ##Security: [[Information-theoretic]]. | ||
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#[http://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1742-6596/766/1/012021 MH (2016)] security proof for generalisation of [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/280034032_Secure_Quantum_Signatures_Using_Insecure_Quantum_Channels AWKA (2015)] to more than two recipients case. | #[http://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1742-6596/766/1/012021 MH (2016)] security proof for generalisation of [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/280034032_Secure_Quantum_Signatures_Using_Insecure_Quantum_Channels AWKA (2015)] to more than two recipients case. | ||
*'''Experimental Papers''' | *'''Experimental Papers''' | ||
#[https://physics.aps.org/featured-article-pdf/10.1103/PhysRevLett.113.040502 CDDWCEJB (2014)] first experimental | #[https://physics.aps.org/featured-article-pdf/10.1103/PhysRevLett.113.040502 CDDWCEJB (2014)] first experimental demonstration of a QDS scheme without quantum memory, implements a variant of [https://arxiv.org/abs/1309.1375 DWA (2013)]. Uses unambiguous state elimination (USE) instead of unambiguous state determination (USD) | ||
##Per half-bit message: rate=1.4 bits per second, security bound=0.01%, Length of the key (L)= <math>10^{13}</math> | ##Per half-bit message: rate=1.4 bits per second, security bound=0.01%, Length of the key (L)= <math>10^{13}</math> | ||
#[https://researchportal.hw.ac.uk/en/publications/experimental-demonstration-of-kilometer-range-quantum-digital-sig DCKAWDJAB(2015)] Implements [https://arxiv.org/abs/1403.5551 WDKA (2015)]. | #[https://researchportal.hw.ac.uk/en/publications/experimental-demonstration-of-kilometer-range-quantum-digital-sig DCKAWDJAB(2015)] Implements [https://arxiv.org/abs/1403.5551 WDKA (2015)]. | ||