Write, autoreview, editor, reviewer
3,125
edits
Quantum Key Distribution: Difference between revisions
no edit summary
m (→References) |
No edit summary |
||
| Line 1: | Line 1: | ||
Quantum key distribution is a task that enables two parties, Alice and Bob, to establish a classical secret key by using quantum systems. A classical secret key is a random string of bits known to only Alice and Bob, and completely unknown to any third party, namely an eavesdropper. Such a secret key can for example be used to encrypt a classical message sent over a public channel. | Quantum key distribution is a task that enables two parties, Alice and Bob, to establish a classical secret key by using quantum systems. A classical secret key is a random string of bits known to only Alice and Bob, and completely unknown to any third party, namely an eavesdropper. Such a secret key can for example be used to encrypt a classical message sent over a public channel. | ||
| Line 23: | Line 22: | ||
*A protocol implements a <math>(n,\epsilon_{\rm corr},\epsilon_{\rm sec},\ell)</math>-QKD if with <math>n</math> rounds it generates an <math>\epsilon_{\rm corr}</math>-correct and <math>\epsilon_{\rm sec}</math>-secret key of size <math>\ell</math> bits. | *A protocol implements a <math>(n,\epsilon_{\rm corr},\epsilon_{\rm sec},\ell)</math>-QKD if with <math>n</math> rounds it generates an <math>\epsilon_{\rm corr}</math>-correct and <math>\epsilon_{\rm sec}</math>-secret key of size <math>\ell</math> bits. | ||
== | ==Further Information== | ||
The security definition presented here, Definition \ref{def:correct} and \ref{def:secret}, are proven to be sufficient to guarantee universal composability for standard QKD in (2). For device-independent quantum key distribution, attacks presented in (1) show that security can be compromised if the same devices are used to implement another instance of the protocol. | The security definition presented here, Definition \ref{def:correct} and \ref{def:secret}, are proven to be sufficient to guarantee universal composability for standard QKD in (2). For device-independent quantum key distribution, attacks presented in (1) show that security can be compromised if the same devices are used to implement another instance of the protocol. | ||