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Quantum Key Distribution: Difference between revisions
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==Discussion== | ==Discussion== | ||
The security definition presented here, Definition \ref{def:correct} and \ref{def:secret}, are proven to be sufficient to guarantee universal composability for standard QKD in (2). For device-independent quantum key distribution, attacks presented in (1) show that security can be compromised if the same devices are used to implement another instance of the protocol. | |||
#[https://journals.aps.org/prl/abstract/10.1103/PhysRevLett.110.010503 BCK (2013)] Analyses device independent QKD | #[https://journals.aps.org/prl/abstract/10.1103/PhysRevLett.110.010503 BCK (2013)] Analyses device independent QKD | ||
#[https://arxiv.org/abs/1409.3525 PR (2014)] discusses security of various QKD schemes composed in other cryptographic protocols. | #[https://arxiv.org/abs/1409.3525 PR (2014)] discusses security of various QKD schemes composed in other cryptographic protocols. | ||
==References== | |||
#C. Portmann and R. Renner, [https://arxiv.org/abs/1409.3525 Cryptographic security of quantum key distribution}] | |||
#J. Barrett, R. Colbeck, and A. Kent, [ Phys. Rev. Lett., vol. 110, p. 010503, (2013) Memory attacks on device-independent quantum cryptography] | |||