Prepare and Measure Quantum Digital Signature: Difference between revisions

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==Discussion==
==Discussion==
The protocol under discussion (1) was the first version of Quantum Digital Signatures with only prepare and measure QKD components. The assumption authenticated quantum channel would render it useless as authenticated quantum channel is a more complex protocol. Thus in (6), a variant of this protocol overcomes this assumption by using a Key generation protocol (not QKD) for authentication where, instead of Seller, Buyer and Verifier sends quantum public keys to the Seller to measure in randomly chosen basis and generate her private keys. Following description for various papers on QDS protocols and their variants have been written keeping in mind the hardware requirements, assumptions, security and method used. One of the papers discusses generalisation of protocols to more than 3 parties and another one discusses security for iterating in case of sending multiple bits.
The protocol under discussion (1) was the first version of Quantum Digital Signatures with only prepare and measure QKD components. The assumption authenticated quantum channel would render it useless as authenticated quantum channel is a more complex protocol. Thus in (6), a variant of this protocol overcomes this assumption by using a Key generation protocol (not QKD) for authentication where, instead of Seller, Buyer and Verifier sends quantum public keys to the Seller to measure in randomly chosen basis and generate her private keys. Following description for various papers on QDS protocols and their variants have been written keeping in mind the hardware requirements, assumptions, security and method used. One of the papers discusses generalisation of protocols to more than 3 parties and another one discusses security for iterating in case of sending multiple bits.
'''Theoretical Papers'''
*'''Theoretical Papers'''
#[https://arxiv.org/abs/1403.5551  WDKA (2015)] above example
#[https://arxiv.org/abs/1403.5551  WDKA (2015)] above example
#[https://arxiv.org/abs/1309.1375 DWA (2013)] first QDS scheme without quantum memory based on [[Coherent State Comparison]].  
#[https://arxiv.org/abs/1309.1375 DWA (2013)] first QDS scheme without quantum memory based on [[Coherent State Comparison]].  
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#[https://www.nature.com/articles/srep09231 WCRZ (2015)] demonstrates sending multi-bit classical messages using [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/280034032_Secure_Quantum_Signatures_Using_Insecure_Quantum_Channels  AWKA (2015)] or other similar protocols.</br>
#[https://www.nature.com/articles/srep09231 WCRZ (2015)] demonstrates sending multi-bit classical messages using [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/280034032_Secure_Quantum_Signatures_Using_Insecure_Quantum_Channels  AWKA (2015)] or other similar protocols.</br>
#[http://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1742-6596/766/1/012021 MH (2016)] security proof for generalisation of [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/280034032_Secure_Quantum_Signatures_Using_Insecure_Quantum_Channels  AWKA (2015)] to more than two recipients case.
#[http://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1742-6596/766/1/012021 MH (2016)] security proof for generalisation of [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/280034032_Secure_Quantum_Signatures_Using_Insecure_Quantum_Channels  AWKA (2015)] to more than two recipients case.
'''Experimental Papers'''
*'''Experimental Papers'''
#[https://physics.aps.org/featured-article-pdf/10.1103/PhysRevLett.113.040502 CDDWCEJB (2014)] first experimental demostartion of a QDS scheme without quantum memory, implements a variant of [https://arxiv.org/abs/1309.1375 DWA (2013)]. Uses unambiguous state elimination (USE) instead of unambiguous state determination (USD)
#[https://physics.aps.org/featured-article-pdf/10.1103/PhysRevLett.113.040502 CDDWCEJB (2014)] first experimental demostartion of a QDS scheme without quantum memory, implements a variant of [https://arxiv.org/abs/1309.1375 DWA (2013)]. Uses unambiguous state elimination (USE) instead of unambiguous state determination (USD)
##Per half-bit message: rate=1.4 bits per second, security bound=0.01%, Length of the key (L)= <math>10^{13}</math>
##Per half-bit message: rate=1.4 bits per second, security bound=0.01%, Length of the key (L)= <math>10^{13}</math>
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