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  • ...r preparation basis to Bob, but Bob does not give the measurement basis to Alice she cannot know which bits they have in common. The protocol works because
    566 bytes (102 words) - 18:48, 18 November 2019
  • ...lipping is a cryptographic primitive which allows two mistrustful parties, Alice and Bob, to remotely generate a random bit, such that none of the two parti ...r to explicit the protocol properties, let us first define and upper-bound Alice and Bob's probabilities of forcing their opponent to declare outcome <math>
    3 KB (468 words) - 17:04, 12 February 2024
  • ...nconditional security for communication. The scheme allows a secret holder Alice can split her secret into <math>n</math> shares and send them to <math>n</m ...recover the secret message from Alice. Neither Bob nor Charlie can extract Alice’s secret on their own. The scheme has a [https://github.com/Yichi-Lionel
    4 KB (699 words) - 20:52, 15 January 2024
  • ...ent was retrieved (user privacy). Bob wants the amount of information that Alice can get on other database elements than the desired one to be bounded (data ** Alice chooses randomly between two scenarios ❶ and ❷.
    9 KB (1,444 words) - 17:49, 26 July 2021
  • ...tion (ideally half) of the bits are lost during the transmission. However, Alice should not know which bits Bob has received, and which bits have been lost. Alice and Bob first agree on a duration <math>\Delta t</math> that should corresp
    7 KB (1,138 words) - 16:29, 12 November 2019
  • ...ent was retrieved (user privacy). Bob wants the amount of information that Alice can get on other database elements than the desired one to be bounded (data ...y length is reduced to match the size of the database, while ensuring that Alice knows approximately one bit of the new key (the position of the known bit i
    9 KB (1,473 words) - 15:53, 26 July 2021
  • ...nd <math display="inline">\psi_B</math> to two of her agents, respectively Alice and Bob ...x_B</math> for the circuit and sends <math display="inline">x_A</math> to Alice and <math display="inline">x_B</math> to Bob.
    4 KB (576 words) - 18:38, 13 September 2021
  • ...assical message encoded as quantum state), referred to as the secret, from Alice to Bob but only with the consent of a third-party, Charlie. A QSS protocol ...sulting in only one party, the receiver, obtaining the quantum secret from Alice, who looses hers during the process. However, <math>(t, n)</math> schemes c
    3 KB (446 words) - 18:15, 13 September 2019
  • ...m systems. A classical secret key is a random string of bits known to only Alice and Bob, and completely unknown to any third party, namely an eavesdropper. ...ure if it is ''correct'' and ''secret''. Correctness is the statement that Alice and Bob share the same string of bits, namely the secret key, at the end of
    4 KB (586 words) - 18:56, 21 December 2020
  • An ideal CKA protocol, with <math>N</math> users, Alice, Bob<math>_1</math>, Bob<math>_2</math>, ..., Bob<math>_{N-1}</math> should : where <math>K_A, K_{B_i}</math> are the final keys held by Alice and Bob<math>_i</math>, and <math>p(K_A = K_{B_1} = ... = K_{B_{N-1}})</ma
    5 KB (829 words) - 21:08, 19 January 2022
  • ...assume the existence of an authenticated public classical channel between Alice and Bob. The protocol shares a classical key between two parties, Alice and Bob.
    12 KB (1,927 words) - 13:53, 15 June 2022
  • ...assume the existence of an authenticated public classical channel between Alice and Bob. ** Alice uses the source to prepare a maximally entangled state and send half of the
    10 KB (1,605 words) - 16:36, 4 November 2019
  • ...urces of weak randomness into a single (close to) uniform, private source. Alice's overarching goal is, therefore, to use her provided apparatus to simulate First, Alice divides up the measurement devices into two groups of four. Then, she divid
    10 KB (1,570 words) - 01:15, 5 November 2019
  • ...k^B</math> and <math>t^B</math>. Alice supplies Bob with <math>k^B</math>. Alice and Bob then respectively send <math>k^A, k^B</math> to the device. # Alice and Bob receive strings <math>c^A</math> and <math>c^B</math>, respectively
    13 KB (2,296 words) - 02:30, 1 February 2022
  • ...two settings and can produce two outputs. Prior to beginning the protocol, Alice has to decide with which confidence she would like her output string to be Alice then takes two bits from the start of the first portion of her initial stri
    9 KB (1,449 words) - 16:52, 4 November 2019
  • ...by Eve. Each of the devices has four settings and can produce two outputs. Alice first groups these devices into two `clusters', each containing four device ...protocol of [https://arxiv.org/abs/1111.6054 Vazirani and Vidick]. First, Alice splits her input string into two equal portions and stashes the second half
    14 KB (2,328 words) - 18:46, 4 November 2019
  • ...Key Generation protocol (KGP) to share public keys from Bob and Charlie to Alice.
    15 KB (2,252 words) - 16:24, 16 October 2019