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#[https://arxiv.org/abs/1505.07509 AWA (2015)] security proof for generalisation of [https://arxiv.org/abs/1403.5551 WDKA (2015)] and [https://arxiv.org/abs/1309.1375 DWA (2013)] to more than two recipients case. | #[https://arxiv.org/abs/1505.07509 AWA (2015)] security proof for generalisation of [https://arxiv.org/abs/1403.5551 WDKA (2015)] and [https://arxiv.org/abs/1309.1375 DWA (2013)] to more than two recipients case. | ||
#[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/280062082_Practical_Quantum_Digital_Signature YFC (2016)] first QDS scheme without authenticated (trusted) quantum channels. Demonstrates one protocol with two implementation, [[two copies of single photon]] method and [[decoy state]] method. First uses single qubit photons in three bases; Private key: classical description of states, Public key: pair of [[non-orthogonal states]] in any two of the three bases. '''Requires''' authenticated classical channels, [[polarisation measurement]] in three bases, [[Unambiguous State Discrimination (USD)]] (State Elimination), uses quantum correlations to check authentication. Decoy State method uses [[phase-randomised weak coherent states]], [[50:50 Beam Splitter (BS)]], [[Unconditionally Secure]] [[Network Stage: Prepare and Measure]]. | #[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/280062082_Practical_Quantum_Digital_Signature YFC (2016)] first QDS scheme without authenticated (trusted) quantum channels. Demonstrates one protocol with two implementation, [[two copies of single photon]] method and [[decoy state]] method. First uses single qubit photons in three bases; Private key: classical description of states, Public key: pair of [[non-orthogonal states]] in any two of the three bases. '''Requires''' authenticated classical channels, [[polarisation measurement]] in three bases, [[Unambiguous State Discrimination (USD)]] (State Elimination), uses quantum correlations to check authentication. Decoy State method uses [[phase-randomised weak coherent states]], [[50:50 Beam Splitter (BS)]], [[Unconditionally Secure]] [[Network Stage: Prepare and Measure]]. | ||
#[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/280034032_Secure_Quantum_Signatures_Using_Insecure_Quantum_Channels AWKA (2015)] QDS scheme without authenticated quantum channels. Uses a Key Generations Protocol (KGP) where noise threshold for Seller-Buyer and Seller-Verifier is better than when distilling secret key from QKD. '''Requires''' authenticated classical channels, [[decoy state BB84 QKD]]. [[Unconditionally Secure]] [[Network Stage: Prepare and Measure]]. | #[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/280034032_Secure_Quantum_Signatures_Using_Insecure_Quantum_Channels AWKA (2015)] QDS scheme without authenticated quantum channels using parameter estimation phase. Uses a Key Generations Protocol (KGP) where noise threshold for Seller-Buyer and Seller-Verifier is better than when distilling secret key from QKD. Seller sends different key to Buyer and Verifier using KGP. This anamoly is justifiable due to symmetrisation.'''Requires''' authenticated classical channels, [[decoy state BB84 QKD]] setup. [[Unconditionally Secure]] [[Network Stage: Prepare and Measure]]. | ||
#[http://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1742-6596/766/1/012021 MH (2016)] security proof for generalisation of [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/280034032_Secure_Quantum_Signatures_Using_Insecure_Quantum_Channels AWKA (2015)] to more than two recipients case. | #[http://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1742-6596/766/1/012021 MH (2016)] security proof for generalisation of [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/280034032_Secure_Quantum_Signatures_Using_Insecure_Quantum_Channels AWKA (2015)] to more than two recipients case. | ||
#[https://www.nature.com/articles/srep09231 WCRZ (2015)] demonstrates sending multi-bit classical messages using [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/280034032_Secure_Quantum_Signatures_Using_Insecure_Quantum_Channels AWKA (2015)] or other similar protocols. | #[https://www.nature.com/articles/srep09231 WCRZ (2015)] demonstrates sending multi-bit classical messages using [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/280034032_Secure_Quantum_Signatures_Using_Insecure_Quantum_Channels AWKA (2015)] or other similar protocols. | ||
#[https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0030402617308069 SWZY (2017)] Discusses an attack and suggests corrections on existing QDS scheme using single qubit rotations. Protocol uses rotation, qubits, [[one-way hash function]]; Private keys: angle of rotation, Public keys: string of rotated quantum states. '''Requires''' [[random number generator]], [[one-way hash function]], quantum memory, key distribution. [[Computationally Secure]], [[Third Network Stage: Quantum Memory|Third Network Stage (Quantum Memory)]] | #[https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0030402617308069 SWZY (2017)] Discusses an attack and suggests corrections on existing QDS scheme using single qubit rotations. Protocol uses rotation, qubits, [[one-way hash function]]; Private keys: angle of rotation, Public keys: string of rotated quantum states. '''Requires''' [[random number generator]], [[one-way hash function]], quantum memory, key distribution. [[Computationally Secure]], [[Third Network Stage: Quantum Memory|Third Network Stage (Quantum Memory)]] | ||
*Experimental Papers | *Experimental Papers | ||