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Prepare and Measure Quantum Digital Signature: Difference between revisions
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Prepare and Measure Quantum Digital Signature (edit)
Revision as of 12:33, 31 October 2018
, 31 October 2018→Properties
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**<math>v^k_l</math>: Verifier’s random bit to determine the measurement basis of <math>l^{th}</math> qubit in <math>|\psi^k\rangle</math> | **<math>v^k_l</math>: Verifier’s random bit to determine the measurement basis of <math>l^{th}</math> qubit in <math>|\psi^k\rangle</math> | ||
**<math>m_{b^k_l}</math>: measurement outcome of <math>b^k_l</math> | **<math>m_{b^k_l}</math>: measurement outcome of <math>b^k_l</math> | ||
</br></br> | |||
*The protocol assumes that all classical and quantum channels are [[authenticated]] (secure). | *The protocol- | ||
# assumes that all classical and quantum channels are [[authenticated]] (secure). | |||
# requires no quantum memory. | |||
# assumes maximum number of participating parties are honest. In the present case at least two parties are honest. | |||
# provides security against repudiation, i.e. the probability that seller succeeds in making buyer and seller disagree on the validity of her sent quantum signature decays exponentially with L, as stated by the formula <math>P(\text{rep})\le e^{-(s_v-s_a)^2L}</math>. | |||
# provides security against forgery, i.e. any recipient (verifier) with high probability rejects any message which was not originally sent by the seller herself. Forging probability is given by the formula, <math>P(\text{forge})\le e^{-(c_{\min}-2s_v)^2L}</math>, where <math>c_{\min}</math> is the minimum possible rate at which buyer declares a single signature element which has been eliminated by the verifier. | |||
===Pseudo Code=== | ===Pseudo Code=== | ||