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| ##Verifier counts the number of mismatches (<math>V^m_l=B^m_l</math>) and returns <math>S_v</math> | | ##Verifier counts the number of mismatches (<math>V^m_l=B^m_l</math>) and returns <math>S_v</math> |
| # If <math>S_v < s_vL/2</math>, Verifier accepts m else he aborts | | # If <math>S_v < s_vL/2</math>, Verifier accepts m else he aborts |
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| ===Properties===
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| ----
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| *The protocol assumes authenticated quantum channels between all seller-receiver pairs.
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| *The protocol assumes authenticated classical channels between all parties.
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| *The protocol is assumes maximum number of participating parties are honest. In the present case at least two parties are honest.
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| *The protocol provides security against repudiation, i.e. the probability that seller succeeds in making buyer and seller disagree on the validity of her sent quantum signature decays exponentially with L, as stated by the formula <math>P(rep)\le e^{-(s_v-s_a)^2L}</math>.
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| *The protocol provides security against forgery, i.e. any recipient (verifier) with high probability rejects any message which was not originally sent by the seller herself. Forging probability is given by the formula, <math>P(forge)\le e^{-(c_{min}-2s_v)^2L}</math>, where <math>c_{min}</math> is the minimum possible rate at which buyer declares a single signature element which has been eliminated by the verifier.
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| == Relevant Papers == | | == Relevant Papers == |