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<!-- Intro: brief description of the protocol --> | <!-- Intro: brief description of the protocol --> | ||
This [https://arxiv.org/abs/1910.03551 example protocol] implements the functionality of Quantum Encryption with Certified Deletion using single-qubit state preparation and measurement. | This [https://arxiv.org/abs/1910.03551 example protocol] implements the functionality of Quantum Encryption with Certified Deletion using single-qubit state preparation and measurement. This scheme is limited to the single-use, private-key setting. | ||
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== | ==Requirements== | ||
* '''Network Stage: ''' [[:Category:Prepare and Measure Network Stage| Prepare and Measure]] | |||
==Outline== | ==Outline== | ||
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==Protocol Description== | ==Protocol Description== | ||
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== | ==Properties== | ||
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This scheme has the following properties: | |||
*'''Correctness''': The scheme includes syndrome and correction functions and is thus robust against a certain amount of noise, i.e. below a certain noise threshold, the decryption circuit outputs the original message with high probability. | |||
*'''Ciphertext Indistinguishability''': This notion implies that an adversary, given a ciphertext, cannot discern whether the original plaintext was a known message or a dummy plaintext <math>0^n</math> | |||
*'''Certified Deletion Security''': After producing a valid deletion certificate, the adversary cannot obtain the original message, even if the key is leaked (after deletion). | |||
==References== | |||
* The scheme along with its formal security definitions and their proofs can be found in [https://arxiv.org/abs/1910.03551 Broadbent & Islam (2019)] | |||
= | <div style='text-align: right;'>''*contributed by Chirag Wadhwa''</div> |