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==Further Information== | ==Further Information== | ||
The security definition presented here, are proven to be sufficient to guarantee universal composability for standard QKD in | The security definition presented here, are proven to be sufficient to guarantee universal composability for standard QKD in [2]. For device-independent quantum key distribution, attacks presented in [1] show that security can be compromised if the same devices are used to implement another instance of the protocol. | ||
#[https://arxiv.org/abs/1409.3525 PR (2014)] discusses security of various QKD schemes composed in other cryptographic protocols. | #[https://arxiv.org/abs/1409.3525 PR (2014)] discusses security of various QKD schemes composed in other cryptographic protocols. | ||
#[https://journals.aps.org/prl/abstract/10.1103/PhysRevLett.110.010503 BCK (2013)] Analyses device independent QKD | #[https://journals.aps.org/prl/abstract/10.1103/PhysRevLett.110.010503 BCK (2013)] Analyses device independent QKD | ||
<div style='text-align: right;'>'' | <div style='text-align: right;'>''contributed by Bas Dirke, Victoria Lipinska, Gl\'aucia Murta and Jérémy Ribeiro''</div> |