Quantum Key Distribution: Difference between revisions

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==Further Information==
==Further Information==
The security definition presented here, are proven to be sufficient to guarantee universal composability for standard QKD in (2). For device-independent quantum key distribution, attacks presented in (1) show that security can be compromised if the same devices are used to implement another instance of the protocol.
The security definition presented here, are proven to be sufficient to guarantee universal composability for standard QKD in (2). For device-independent quantum key distribution, attacks presented in (1) show that security can be compromised if the same devices are used to implement another instance of the protocol.
 
#[https://arxiv.org/abs/1409.3525 PR (2014)] discusses security of various QKD schemes composed in other cryptographic protocols.
#[https://journals.aps.org/prl/abstract/10.1103/PhysRevLett.110.010503 BCK (2013)] Analyses device independent QKD
#[https://journals.aps.org/prl/abstract/10.1103/PhysRevLett.110.010503 BCK (2013)] Analyses device independent QKD
#[https://arxiv.org/abs/1409.3525 PR (2014)] discusses security of various QKD schemes composed in other cryptographic protocols.
==References==
#C. Portmann and R. Renner, [https://arxiv.org/abs/1409.3525 Cryptographic security of quantum key distribution]
#J. Barrett, R. Colbeck, and A. Kent, [https://journals.aps.org/prl/abstract/10.1103/PhysRevLett.110.010503 Memory attacks on device-independent quantum cryptography]
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