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==Discussion== | ==Discussion== | ||
'''Theoretical Papers''' | |||
#[https://arxiv.org/abs/1403.5551 WDKA (2015)] above example | #[https://arxiv.org/abs/1403.5551 WDKA (2015)] above example | ||
#[https://arxiv.org/abs/1309.1375 DWA (2013)] first QDS scheme without quantum memory based on [ | #[https://arxiv.org/abs/1309.1375 DWA (2013)] | ||
#[https://journals.aps.org/pra/abstract/10.1103/PhysRevA.90.042335 AL (2014)] Establishes coherent state mapping of (2). Replaces SWAP Test with beam splitters. Uses [[Unambiguous State Discrimination (USD)]] (State Elimination). '''Requires''' [[Phase encoded Coherent states]], [[Balanced Beam Splitters]]. No explicit security proof provided. | ##first QDS scheme without quantum memory based on [[Coherent State Comparison]]. | ||
##'''Requires''' [[Coherent States]], authenticated quantum and classical channels, [[multiports]], [[Unambiguous State Discrimination (USD)]] (State Elimination), no symmetrisation required. | |||
##'''Security:''' Information-theoretic | |||
#[https://journals.aps.org/pra/abstract/10.1103/PhysRevA.90.042335 AL (2014)] | |||
##Establishes coherent state mapping of (2). Replaces SWAP Test with beam splitters. Uses [[Unambiguous State Discrimination (USD)]] (State Elimination). | |||
##'''Requires''' [[Coherent States|Phase encoded Coherent states]], [[Balanced Beam Splitters]]. | |||
##No explicit security proof provided. | |||
#[https://arxiv.org/abs/1505.07509 AWA (2015)] security proof for generalisation of [https://arxiv.org/abs/1403.5551 WDKA (2015)] and [https://arxiv.org/abs/1309.1375 DWA (2013)] to more than two recipients case. | #[https://arxiv.org/abs/1505.07509 AWA (2015)] security proof for generalisation of [https://arxiv.org/abs/1403.5551 WDKA (2015)] and [https://arxiv.org/abs/1309.1375 DWA (2013)] to more than two recipients case. | ||
#[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/280062082_Practical_Quantum_Digital_Signature YFC (2016)] first QDS scheme without authenticated (trusted) quantum channels. Demonstrates one protocol with two implementation, | #[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/280062082_Practical_Quantum_Digital_Signature YFC (2016)] | ||
#[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/280034032_Secure_Quantum_Signatures_Using_Insecure_Quantum_Channels AWKA (2015)] QDS scheme without authenticated quantum channels using parameter estimation phase. Uses a Key Generations Protocol (KGP) where noise threshold for Seller-Buyer and Seller-Verifier is better than when distilling secret key from QKD. Seller sends different key to Buyer and Verifier using KGP. This anamoly is justifiable due to symmetrisation.'''Requires''' authenticated classical channels, [[ | ##first QDS scheme without authenticated (trusted) quantum channels. Demonstrates one protocol with two implementation, two copies of single photon method and decoy state method. First uses single qubit photons in three bases; Private key: classical description of states, Public key: pair of [[non-orthogonal states]] in any two of the three bases. | ||
##'''Requires''' authenticated classical channels, [[polarisation measurement]] in three bases, [[Unambiguous State Discrimination (USD)]] (State Elimination), uses quantum correlations to check authentication. Decoy State method uses [[Coherent States|phase-randomised weak coherent states]], [[50:50 Beam Splitter (BS)]]. | |||
##Security: [[Information-theoretic]]. | |||
#[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/280034032_Secure_Quantum_Signatures_Using_Insecure_Quantum_Channels AWKA (2015)] | |||
##QDS scheme without authenticated quantum channels using parameter estimation phase. Uses a Key Generations Protocol (KGP) where noise threshold for Seller-Buyer and Seller-Verifier is better than when distilling secret key from QKD. Seller sends different key to Buyer and Verifier using KGP. This anamoly is justifiable due to symmetrisation. | |||
##'''Requires''' authenticated classical channels, [[Decoy State QKD]] setup. | |||
##Security: [[Information-theoretic]]. | |||
#[http://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1742-6596/766/1/012021 MH (2016)] security proof for generalisation of [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/280034032_Secure_Quantum_Signatures_Using_Insecure_Quantum_Channels AWKA (2015)] to more than two recipients case. | #[http://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1742-6596/766/1/012021 MH (2016)] security proof for generalisation of [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/280034032_Secure_Quantum_Signatures_Using_Insecure_Quantum_Channels AWKA (2015)] to more than two recipients case. | ||
#[https://www.nature.com/articles/srep09231 WCRZ (2015)] demonstrates sending multi-bit classical messages using [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/280034032_Secure_Quantum_Signatures_Using_Insecure_Quantum_Channels AWKA (2015)] or other similar protocols. | #[https://www.nature.com/articles/srep09231 WCRZ (2015)] demonstrates sending multi-bit classical messages using [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/280034032_Secure_Quantum_Signatures_Using_Insecure_Quantum_Channels AWKA (2015)] or other similar protocols.</br> | ||
'''Experimental Papers''' | |||
[[Category:Prepare and Measure Network Stage]] | [[Category:Prepare and Measure Network Stage]] | ||