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m (Shraddha moved page Category:Network Stage (Prepare and Measure) to Category:Prepare and Measure Network Stage) |
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This stage is the �first to offer end-to-end quantum functionality. Any node | |||
here is allowed to prepare one qubit state and transmit the resulting state to | |||
any other node, which then receives and measures it. In this case, the other | |||
node can either measure the qubit or conclude that it is lost. Transmissions | |||
and measurements can be post-selected, a signal that the qubit is lost may | |||
be generated instead. For instance, the receiving node is allowed to ignore | |||
non-detection events and conclude that such qubits are lost. | |||
If the sender can prepare an entangled state of two qubits then this stage | |||
also includes the case in which the sender can prepare an entangled state and | |||
send the two entangled qubits to two di�erent nodes in the network. This | |||
entanglement distribution is also post-selected. However this post selected | |||
prepare and measure functionality is not equivalent to transmitting arbitrary | |||
qubits over the network. | |||
Applications: | |||
This stage allows tasks like QKD, where a secure private key can be gener- | |||
ated between two nodes, which is secure against any eavesdropper having any | |||
kind of computational power. Nodes can have their password veri�ed without | |||
leaking it. | |||
Another class of protocols in this stage is in the domain of two-party cryp- | |||
tography. Here, there is no eavesdropper, but rather Alice and Bob themselves | |||
do not trust each other. An example of such a task is secure identi�cation, | |||
in which Alice (a potentially impersonating user) may wish to identify herself | |||
to Bob (a potentially malicious server or automated teller machine) without | |||
revealing her authentication credentials. Provable security can be achieved in | |||
this case. | |||
Other known protocols in this stage include (position veri�cation) (link here) | |||
which is weakened forms of two party cryptographic tasks that can form building blocks, such as imperfect bit commitments (link here) and coin-flipping | |||
(link here) | |||
[[Category:Network Stages]] | [[Category:Network Stages]] |