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Prepare and Measure Quantum Digital Signature: Difference between revisions
Prepare and Measure Quantum Digital Signature (edit)
Revision as of 14:20, 22 October 2018
, 22 October 2018→Example: https://arxiv.org/abs/1403.5551
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**<math>v^k_l</math>: Verifier’s random bit to determine the measurement basis of <math>l^{th}</math> qubit in <math>|\psi^k\rangle</math> | **<math>v^k_l</math>: Verifier’s random bit to determine the measurement basis of <math>l^{th}</math> qubit in <math>|\psi^k\rangle</math> | ||
**<math>m_{b^k_l}</math>: measurement outcome of <math>b^k_l</math> | **<math>m_{b^k_l}</math>: measurement outcome of <math>b^k_l</math> | ||
=== Requirements === | |||
*L : length of quantum public keys. | |||
*<math>s_a:</math> authentication threshold per qubit. | |||
*<math>s_v: (s_a < s_v)</math> verification threshold per qubit. | |||
*Authenticated quantum channels between all seller-receiver pairs. | |||
*Authenticated classical channels between all parties. | |||
*No quantum memory required. | |||
---- | |||
===Properties=== | ===Properties=== | ||
---- | ---- | ||
*The protocol assumes maximum number of participating parties are honest. In the present case at least two parties are honest. | *The protocol assumes maximum number of participating parties are honest. In the present case at least two parties are honest. | ||
*The protocol provides security against repudiation, i.e. the probability that seller succeeds in making buyer and seller disagree on the validity of her sent quantum signature decays exponentially with L, as stated by the formula <math>P(rep)\le e^{-(s_v-s_a)^2L}</math>. | *The protocol provides security against repudiation, i.e. the probability that seller succeeds in making buyer and seller disagree on the validity of her sent quantum signature decays exponentially with L, as stated by the formula <math>P(rep)\le e^{-(s_v-s_a)^2L}</math>. | ||