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Measurement Device Independent Quantum Digital Signature (MDI-QDS): Difference between revisions
Measurement Device Independent Quantum Digital Signature (MDI-QDS) (edit)
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*[[Authenticated quantum channel]] | *[[Authenticated quantum channel]] | ||
*[[Authenticated classical channel]] | *[[Authenticated classical channel]] | ||
*'''Estimated parameters''' (for security level of order <math>10^{-5}</math>) | |||
**Signature length:<math>10^{6}</math> for each message bit 0 and 1. | |||
**Transmission distance: 50km | |||
**Estimated time to generate raw keys: 93 minutes (can be improved by using detectors with better efficiency) | |||
*MDI-QKD setup (without error correction and privacy amplification) | *MDI-QKD setup (without error correction and privacy amplification) | ||
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* The strings generated by Sender and Receiver are free from detector side channel attacks as one does not trust measurement devices. | * The strings generated by Sender and Receiver are free from detector side channel attacks as one does not trust measurement devices. | ||
* Implementation of long distance MDI-QKD [Measurement Device Independent Quantum Digital Signature (MDI-QDS)#References|(3)] employs establishes long distance QDS protocol without side channel attacks | * Implementation of long distance MDI-QKD [Measurement Device Independent Quantum Digital Signature (MDI-QDS)#References|(3)] employs establishes long distance QDS protocol without side channel attacks | ||
*It removes all detector side-channel attacks | |||
* It is valid against repudiation and forging attacks | * It is valid against repudiation and forging attacks | ||
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==Further Information== | ==Further Information== | ||
MDI-QDS is so far the best [[:Category:Prepare and Measure Network Stage|Prepare and Measure Network Stage]] QDS protocol. It does not rely on the measurement devices and is easy from implementation point of view. As the platform of widely implemented MDI-QKD is available, MDI-QDS can be implemented most efficiently and provides the best security in the QDS protocols discovered so far. Another approach would be to adapt DI-QKD for key generation. Here one would neither trust the measurement devices nor the source. As seller and buyer both act as an adversary in QDS protocols, we do not want depend on our state preparation devices either. This has not been studied yet due to as QDS protocols discovered so far yet do not match up to the efficiency of classical and post-quantum digital signature schemes in terms of signing time, key length, etc. | |||
==References== | ==References== | ||
# [https://arxiv.org/abs/1507.02975 AWKA (2015)] | # [https://arxiv.org/abs/1507.02975 AWKA (2015)] | ||
#[https://arxiv.org/abs/1109.1473 Lo et al (2011)] | #[https://arxiv.org/abs/1109.1473 Lo et al (2011)] | ||
#[https://aip.scitation.org/doi/10.1063/1.4817672 Xu et al (2013)] | |||
<div style='text-align: right;'>''*contributed by Shraddha Singh''</div> | <div style='text-align: right;'>''*contributed by Shraddha Singh''</div> | ||