Polynomial Code based Quantum Authentication: Difference between revisions
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
No edit summary |
No edit summary |
||
| Line 1: | Line 1: | ||
The [https://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/0205128.pdf example protocol] provides a non-interactive scheme for the sender to encrypt as well as [[Authentication of Quantum Messages|authenticate]] quantum messages. It was the first protocol designed to achieve the task of authentication for quantum states, i.e. it gives the guarantee that the message sent by a party ( | The [https://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/0205128.pdf example protocol] provides a non-interactive scheme for the sender to encrypt as well as [[Authentication of Quantum Messages|authenticate]] quantum messages. It was the first protocol designed to achieve the task of authentication for quantum states, i.e. it gives the guarantee that the message sent by a party (suppliant) over a communication line is received by a party on the other end (authenticator) as it is and, has not been tampered with or modified by the dishonest party (eavesdropper). | ||
'''Tags:''' [[:Category:Two Party Protocols|Two Party Protocol]][[Category:Two Party Protocols]], [[:Category:Quantum Functionality|Quantum Functionality]][[Category:Quantum Functionality]], [[:Category:Specific Task|Specific Task]][[Category:Specific Task]], [[:Category:Building Blocks|Building Block]][[Category:Building Blocks]] | |||
==Assumptions== | ==Assumptions== | ||
*The sender and the receiver share a private (known to only the two of them), classical random key drawn from a probability distribution. | *The sender and the receiver share a private (known to only the two of them), classical random key drawn from a probability distribution. | ||
Revision as of 03:42, 18 June 2019
The example protocol provides a non-interactive scheme for the sender to encrypt as well as authenticate quantum messages. It was the first protocol designed to achieve the task of authentication for quantum states, i.e. it gives the guarantee that the message sent by a party (suppliant) over a communication line is received by a party on the other end (authenticator) as it is and, has not been tampered with or modified by the dishonest party (eavesdropper).
Tags: Two Party Protocol, Quantum Functionality, Specific Task, Building Block
Assumptions
- The sender and the receiver share a private (known to only the two of them), classical random key drawn from a probability distribution.
Outline
Notations
- : security parameter
- Failed to parse (SVG (MathML can be enabled via browser plugin): Invalid response ("Math extension cannot connect to Restbase.") from server "https://wikimedia.org/api/rest_v1/":): {\displaystyle m} : number of qubits in the message.
Properties
- For an qubit message, the protocol requires Failed to parse (SVG (MathML can be enabled via browser plugin): Invalid response ("Math extension cannot connect to Restbase.") from server "https://wikimedia.org/api/rest_v1/":): {\displaystyle m+s} qubits encoded state, and a private key of Failed to parse (SVG (MathML can be enabled via browser plugin): Invalid response ("Math extension cannot connect to Restbase.") from server "https://wikimedia.org/api/rest_v1/":): {\displaystyle 2m+O(s)} .
Pseudo Code
Further Information
References
contributed by Shraddha Singh